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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TROUBLED TIMES: 
STABILIZING DEMOCRACY IN A SECOND-BEST 
WORLD* 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF** 
Debates over the role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy gravitate 
to one of two poles. Either the debates are framed in terms of the power of courts 
countering the outputs of a well-ordered legislative process, or they are framed 
in terms of minority rights that are ever vulnerable to the tyranny of the 
majority. 
This Article parts company with the customary debate in two ways. First, the 
inquiry focuses on the structures of democratic governance rather than the 
relation between a governing majority and the rights of disfavored individuals 
or minorities. Second, and contrary to the conditions assumed by critics of 
judicial review such as Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy, this Article aims 
to look directly to the “contaminated” domain of our lived experience in the 
moment rather than an idealized vision of well-ordered parliamentary 
sovereignty. Especially in a time of populist challenges to the institutionalization 
of democratic politics, the role of constitutional courts as potential brakes on the 
politics of immediacy takes on greater and greater significance. 
Relying on examples from jurisdictions around the world, this Article sets out 
three types of interventions ranging in terms of how problematic they are for 
democratic governance. First is the use of constitutional review to prevent 
entrenched officeholders from undermining their electoral accountability, as seen 
in places as far removed as Taiwan and North Carolina. The second is the role 
of court interventions to bolster what is termed the “soft power” of democracy in 
which institutional norms compel a politics of negotiation and compromise. 
Finally, there is the temptation for courts to substitute judicial authority for 
failing state competence of democracies in general, and of the legislative branches 
in particular. 
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In each case, this Article examines judicial review to determine to what extent 
the judiciary can serve as an institutional buffer in protecting democracy against 
systemic failure, sometimes on matters that may pertain to fundamental liberties 
but more often on questions of the exercise of governmental authority. The 
question here is whether, in times of challenge to democratic functioning, the 
judiciary may play a stabilizing role in warding off temporary political 
expedients that threaten governmental integrity. The term “stabilization” 
invokes the role of a central banker charged with maintaining fiscal integrity in 
the face of inevitable partisan demands for unsustainable short-term returns. In 
turn, the inquiry is whether judicial interventions in defense of the structural 
integrity of democratic rule can be thought of in similar terms of conservatorship 
by a semi-independent entity and, in turn, how this institutional role of the 
judiciary might be utilized in times of systemic stress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Too much American constitutional law engages a ritualized set of 
exchanges over judicial review. Even when stripped of the normative valence as 
a defense or critique of Brown, or Roe, or Lochner, or Dred Scott, the arguments 
loop back onto themselves. At bottom is always the concern over the legitimacy 
of judicial arrogation of the power to set aside the desired objectives of the 
democratically accountable political branches. The countermajoritarian 
dilemma is the shorthand for the peculiar ability of the weakest branch of 
government to claim a privileged, if not monopolistic, power to invoke 
constitutional authority as the supreme law of the land. This Article argues that 
judicial review may play a critical role in stabilizing democratic governance for 
reasons not having to do with rights preservation or with the usurpation of 
political authority from the elected branches. All democracies carry the seeds of 
their own fragility, and this Article aims to examine how judicial review can 
provide stability when these seeds take root. Rather than assume away threats 
to democratic order, this Article will ground itself in the real, imperfect world 
of threatened democracy. 
More than a half century after Alexander Bickel published his field-
defining monograph, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Politics,1 the debates in American constitutional law continue unabated. 
Oddly, the American “obsession,” as framed by Barry Friedman,2 persists even 
as the rest of the democratic world has assumed the centrality of constitutional 
courts in framing the post-World War II democratic order. All postwar 
democracies feature an apex court with the power to review the constitutionality 
of legislation, a marked departure from the status quo prior to World War II, 
in which the United States stood largely isolated in the scope of its judicial 
power of constitutional invalidation of legislation.3 Indeed, in the “third wave”4 
of democratic creation after the fall of the Soviet Union, the centrality and 
power of these courts has only increased.5 As set out in my work, Fragile 
 
 1. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962) (“The authority to determine the meaning and application of a 
written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in the document itself. This is not to say 
that the power of judicial review cannot be placed in the Constitution; merely that it cannot be found 
there.”).  
 2. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
 3. DIETER GRIMM, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 199 (2016). 
 4. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–5 (1991). 
 5. Although it is hard to measure in the full light of actual practice, one estimate is that over 
eighty percent of countries now have a high court with the judicial review authority to strike down 
offending legislation. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 
30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 587, 587 (2013).  
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Democracies,6 there is not much logic in creating a tribunal with jurisdiction 
targeted at the constitutionality of governmental conduct if the aim is not to 
invite judicial review of the political branches.7 One does not give a carpenter a 
hammer without anticipating that he will soon start finding nails. 
And yet, the customary debate persists. The current malaise of democratic 
governance is a good time to reengage the questions over the role of judicial 
review, understood here as the institutional capacity of an apex court to limit 
the boundaries of political choice. The analytic impulse that follows is exactly 
the opposite of the organizing principle for much of the debate about judicial 
oversight. My colleague Jeremy Waldron forcefully defines the core theoretical 
debate as one searching for “some general understanding, uncontaminated by 
the cultural, historical, and political preoccupations of each society.”8 Such an 
approach assumes “a democratic culture and electoral and legislative institutions 
in reasonably good working order”9 as a precondition to the question of “what 
reason can there be for wanting to set up a nonelective process to review and 
sometimes override the work that the legislature has done?”10 For another 
leading critic of judicial intervention, Richard Bellamy, the ideal condition 
could be threatened by declines in turnout and party membership, an electorate 
that is “too vast and diverse,” and a scale of government “too large for citizens 
to be able effectively to relate to each other.”11 For both Waldron and Bellamy, 
so long as the democratic preconditions are met, only legislatures provide “an 
equitable process for deciding between individuals’ often competing claims.”12 
As Bellamy elaborates, “the basic components of such an arrangement consist 
in citizens having an equal vote in common elections where political parties 
compete for the people’s vote and electoral and legislative decisions are made 
by majority rule.”13 
For Bellamy, the debate over judicial constitutionalism begins 
axiomatically with the proposition that “[c]entral to legal constitutionalism is 
the idea of constitutional rights.”14 This is a common assumption shared across 
the various positions on judicial review. On the other side of the ledger, 
arguments for judicial intervention to overcome the deficiencies of democratic 
 
 6. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 189–213 (2015). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE. L.J. 1346, 1352 (2006) 
[hereinafter Waldron, Core of the Case]. 
 9. Id. at 1362. 
 10. Id. 
 11. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 260–61 (2007). 
 12. Id. at 212; see Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1346. 
 13. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 219. 
 14. Id. at 15. 
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processes usually begin (and end) with the key concern that a too-powerful 
majority will see no electoral incentive to safeguard the interests of a disfavored 
minority. On this view, judicial review invoking a higher-order legal authority 
is a necessary corrective for the concern over discrete and insular minorities 
facing the disregard of a tyrannous majority. Even here, the discussion takes on 
a stylized character at high levels of abstraction. As Theunis Roux notes, “[T]he 
wide array of pathologies in the functioning of representative institutions, 
including the poor quality of deliberation in such institutions, makes it 
impossible to generalise about the relative merits of judicial versus legislative 
attention to rights.”15 
This Article parts company with the customary debate in two key ways. 
First, this Article addresses the structures of democratic governance rather than 
the relation between a governing majority and the rights of disfavored 
individuals or minorities. Judicial review is examined to determine to what 
extent the judiciary can serve as an institutional buffer in protecting democracy 
against systemic failure, sometimes on matters that may pertain to fundamental 
liberties, but more often on questions of the exercise of governmental authority. 
The question here is whether in times of challenge to democratic functioning 
the judiciary may play a stabilizing role in warding off temporary political 
expedients that threaten governmental integrity. 
Judicial review is one of many mechanisms that remove from direct and 
immediate democratic accountability institutions that may be predictability 
compromised in the press of political expediency. The term “stabilization” 
invokes the role of a central banker charged with maintaining fiscal integrity in 
the face of inevitable partisan demands for unsustainable short-term returns. In 
turn, the inquiry is whether judicial interventions in defense of the structural 
integrity of democratic rule can be thought in similar terms of conservatorship 
by a semi-independent entity. 
The second point of departure follows, and here the aim is to look directly 
to the “contaminated” domain of our lived experience in the moment. To quote 
Roux again, “The question whether judicial review would be morally justified 
if various assumptions hold is in any case not the question that these societies 
actually confront.”16 The critical inquiry is not an idealized world of healthy 
parliamentary exchange but the current disabilities of democratic governance in 
nearly all states ruled by popular sovereignty. Were we to live among the angels, 
as Madison once noted, institutional constraints would be unnecessary.17 In the 
second-best domain of real-world conflict and uncertainty, the discussion 
 
 15. Theunis Roux, In Defence of Empirical Entanglement: The Methodological Flaw in Waldron’s Case 
Against Judicial Review, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF DELIBERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
203, 203 (Ron Levy et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Roux, In Defence of Empirical Entanglement]. 
 16. Id. at 209. 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). 
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should move beyond Platonic ideals.18 Rather than assuming the operation of a 
healthy democracy running on all of its institutional gears, I begin with the real-
world observation that all is not well in the house of democratic governance. In 
accepting neither the health of democracy nor the centrality-of-rights concerns 
as the analytic point of departure, it is my aim to take the debate over judicial 
review off of its customary theoretical mooring and ground it in the messy 
reality of lived experience. 
Each point of departure asks not about the idealized vision of how 
individual rights are best protected in a democratic culture but rather what the 
institutional role of the judiciary might be in times of systemic stress. This alters 
the analytic framework substantially. Virtually the entire debate over judicial 
review is framed in the language of rights discourse that dominated 
constitutional thought in the second half of the twentieth century. The rights 
focus is not only jurisprudential, most notably in the work of Ronald Dworkin,19 
but is also found in the practical application of constitutional adjudication in 
the American context. Whether the object of debate is Brown20 or Roe21 or 
Heller,22 the claim is always that certain rights are so centrally guaranteed to the 
citizenry that the judiciary not only may, but indeed must, be the Herculean 
guarantor of the deepest constitutional values of the society. As a general 
matter, the rights claims reject Waldron’s invitation to compare the practical 
and legitimacy gains from allowing the democratic institutions of the society to 
take up the definitional dimensions of citizenship. Certain matters are simply 
outside the democratic bargain once embroidered as human rights or 
constitutional entitlements. 
The argument about a structural role for judicial engagement is not new. 
It was anticipated in John Hart Ely’s classic recounting of the Carolene Products 
footnote to focus less on the characterization of discrete and insular minorities 
and more on the conditions disabling the capacity for democratic self-repair.23 
For Ely, the critical justification for judicial intervention was the preservation 
 
 18. See Mark Tushnet, How Different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases For and Against Judicial 
Review?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (2010) (comparing core cases for and against judicial 
review and concluding that the authors’ “different dispositions” lead them to “characterize their quite 
similar positions in [a] dramatic ‘against-for’ manner”). 
 19. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 4 (1977) (discussing the 
persistent focus on jurisprudence); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1–3 (1986) (discussing judicial 
power and interpretation).  
 20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 22. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 23. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 
(1980). 
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of democratic competition and electoral accountability.24 In turn, the focus on 
the preservation of the structural integrity of democracy was the key move in 
recapturing a slice of American constitutional law under the rubric of the law of 
democracy.25 And, as Rosalind Dixon noted, that same approach underlies the 
extension of a non-rights-based look at the role of constitutional courts in fragile 
democracies—what she termed the international turn in the law of democracy 
canon.26 
Less evident is the other half of the attack on judicial review. Here the 
question is what happens if democracy is not in full working order? Does it 
make a difference for the critics of judicial review if the question is not posed 
in the first-best world of perfectly working institutions, but rather in the 
second-best world in which democratic institutions are failing? The world of 
the second best is always treacherous. But even economists willing to entrust 
just about all human engagements to self-realizing market exchanges reserve a 
special place for market failure. Despite the many debates over when and under 
what circumstances markets do indeed fail, even the most ardent of free 
marketeers recognize the role for a regulatory intervention when markets are 
dominated by noninternalizable externalities, by underproduction of public 
goods, or by anticompetitive collusive behavior.27 Is there a corresponding 
concept of democratic failure, conditions that command an institutional 
response to the inability of democratic institutions to play their assigned role? 
Shifting the debate over judicial review into the domain of the second best 
does not yield easy answers about how far judicial intervention may go in the 
name of curing institutional process failure. The most sophisticated challenge 
to democratic integrity comes in the powerful and disturbing application of 
public choice theory by Justice Luis Roberto Barroso of the Supreme Federal 
Court of Brazil (“STF”).28 For Justice Barroso, institutional failure is not an 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 8–9 (5th ed. 2016).  
 26. See Rosalind Dixon, ‘Politics as Markets’ Goes Global, JOTWELL (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://intl.jotwell.com/politics-as-markets-goes-global/ [https://perma.cc/Z5ZH-66JS] (reviewing 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015)); see also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 189–213. 
 27. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 48 (2018) (“Western liberals concluded that capitalism, 
whatever its limitations, was the superior method of economic organization. The best approach to 
monopoly was antitrust law, . . . regulation, and limited state ownership in the most important 
industries.”). 
 28. Luís Roberto Barroso, Reason Without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of 
Constitutional Courts, in DEMOCRATIZING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71, 79–80 (Thomas Bustamante & 
Bernado Gonçalves Fernandes eds., 2016) [hereinafter Barroso, Reason Without Vote]; see Luís Roberto 
Barroso, Countermajoritarian, Representative, and Enlightened: The Roles of Constitutional Courts in 
Democracies, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 128 (2019) [hereinafter Barroso, Countermajoritarian] (“[I]t should 
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episodic feature of legislative democracy but an ever-present attribute of the 
ability of concentrated sectional claims to defeat the dissipated public interest 
in the battle for public goods.29 Brazil may represent an extreme example30 with 
more than a third of the national legislature under indictment for corruption;31 
with the last three presidents successively in prison,32 impeached,33 and having 
left office with a five percent approval rating in the face of massive corruption 
scandals;34 and with a current president pushing the boundaries of the spectrum 
of acceptable democratic leaders.35 But Barroso does not raise an episodic 
question about Brazil in a moment of political crisis. Rather, he offers a well-
grounded concern about special interest capture of the regulatory capacity of 
democratic states.36 If such capture is endemic to the political branches, posits 
Barroso, then perhaps the judiciary is the sole branch immune from political 
distortions.37 From this follows a stirring defense of the social rights activism of 
some of the more engaged apex courts around the world, notably Brazil and 
Colombia.38 
My aim here is to resist both of these polar roles for the judiciary as 
exemplified by Waldron and Bellamy on one end and Barroso on the other. I 
want neither passivity in the hope that idealized visions of parliamentary 
sovereignty will emerge nor overarching intervention into the allocation of 
 
not be surprising that the Supreme Court, though not as a general rule, functions as an interpreter of 
social sentiment.”). 
 29. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 128–29. 
 30. Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is This the Biggest Corruption Scandal in History?, 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-
wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history [https://perma.cc/TTH9-DX97]. 
 31. See Ricardo Brito & Lisandra Paraguassu, Brazil Judge Orders Corruption Probe into a Third of 
Temer’s Cabinet, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-probes-
idUSKBN17D2KB?il=0 [https://perma.cc/TW2K-SXQ8].  
 32. Manuela Andreoni, Ernesto Londoño & Shasta Darlington, Ex-President ‘Lula’ of Brazil 
Surrenders to Serve 12-Year Jail Term, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/world/americas/brazil-lula-surrenders-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-
.html [https://perma.cc/UD7C-9MF8 (dark archive)]. 
 33. Catherine E. Shoichet & Euan McKirdy, Brazil’s Senate Ousts Dilma Rousseff in Impeachment 
Vote, CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/americas/brazil-rousseff-impeachment-
vote/index.html [https://perma.cc/6UR5-DZ2X]. 
 34. Lisandra Paraguassú & Anthony Boadle, Brazil President’s Popularity Mired at Lows in Election 
Year: Poll, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-poll/brazil-
presidents-popularity-mired-at-lows-in-election-year-poll-idUSKCN1HC1RL 
[https://perma.cc/3567-8CAM] (noting that then-President Michel Temer’s approval rating had 
dropped to five percent). 
 35. See generally Claire Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout 
[https://perma.cc/3FHL-M6CD (dark archive)] (detailing corruption in Brazil’s top levels of 
government). 
 36. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 128–29. 
 37. Id. at 129–30. 
 38. Id. at 130–33. 
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government services and resources in the name of state incapacity. Hopefully, 
there is a middle ground in which democratic debility necessitates heightened 
judicial scrutiny without substituting judicial command for democratic self-
governance. In particular, the rise of populist demands, fueled by a 
noninstitutional sense of a plebiscitary mandate, makes the modern role of the 
judiciary an all the more pressing issue. 
This Article presents three different circumstances in which democracies 
may be under serious challenge: when attempts are made to end or frustrate 
electoral accountability of the governors, when the norms of democratic 
governance are undermined, and when there is manifest disregard for the 
interests of predictable sectors of the population. When executive overreach, 
populist extremism, or loss of legislative competence pushes courts into the 
breach, the need for judicial intermediation presents itself most directly. What 
follows is an attempt to sort through the messy reality of judicial review as a 
response to democratic incapacity in the unfortunately very real world that 
surrounds us. 
I.  ASSUMING A WELL-FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY, OR NOT 
In addressing the role of judicial review in the second-best world of 
political reality, it is useful to highlight the points of departure between the 
idealized versions of democratic governance and what we actually have. The 
title of this Article speaks of “troubled times,” and some attention needs to be 
directed at how the troubles play out in terms of the demands made upon the 
judiciary. 
A. Idealized Democracies 
There is great value in examining idealized social engagements to elucidate 
the nature of the lived experience. Most famously, Ronald Coase explored the 
behavior of firms in a hypothesized world free of transactions costs, not so as to 
claim that such a world did or should exist, but in order to examine how firms 
behave in response to the reality of transactional hurdles in every aspect of their 
existence.39 In Waldron’s case, the equivalent transaction-cost-less democratic 
order is characterized thusly: 
This society has a broadly democratic political system with universal 
adult suffrage, and it has a representative legislature, to which elections 
are held on a fair and regular basis. I assume that this legislature is a large 
deliberative body, accustomed to dealing with difficult issues, including 
important issues of justice and social policy. The legislators deliberate 
and vote on public issues, and the procedures for lawmaking are elaborate 
 
 39. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 395 (1937); R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–19 (1960). 
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and responsible, and incorporate various safeguards, such as 
bicameralism, robust committee scrutiny, and multiple levels of 
consideration, debate, and voting. I assume that these processes connect 
both formally (through public hearings and consultation procedures) and 
informally with wider debates in the society.40 
These preconditions are certainly recognizable from contemporary 
democracies, at least aspirationally. The list understates the critical role 
assumed by intermediary institutions, most notably political parties. Indeed, as 
famously formulated by E.E. Schattschneider, “political parties created 
democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the 
parties.”41 For Waldron, parties are more the mechanism for legislators to rise 
above parochial demands,42 as famously formulated by Edmund Burke in his 
address to the electors of Bristol.43 
On the other hand, the demand for bicameralism as a necessary condition 
is a bit odd, as it would exclude from the debate Israel and New Zealand and 
allow for the inclusion of Great Britain only by virtue of the House of Lords, 
an institution certainly lacking in democratic pedigree.44 If democratic 
legitimacy emerges from the open process of selection of the governors by the 
governed, the exacting specificity of bicameralism appears out of place. 
On closer inspection, however, the inclusion of bicameralism and the 
diminished role of political parties is not so much idiosyncratic or mistaken as 
unexplained.45 Waldron’s exclusive focus on judicial review results in the 
understatement of any theory as to what these other institutional preconditions 
are supposed to accomplish. Let me now essay to fill in the picture of proper 
democratic governance against which judicial intervention is juxtaposed. 
There are two organizing principles to Waldron’s list of democratic 
preconditions. One may take issue with the bill of particulars, and certainly 
there are long historic debates about “thin” versions of democracy turning on 
elections with a broad franchise versus “thick” versions that carry an expandable 
list of social rights, minimum entitlements, and other elements that enrich civic 
 
 40. Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1361. 
 41. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (9th prtg. 1959). 
 42. Waldron, Core of the Case, supra note 8, at 1361 (“I assume too that there are political parties, 
and that legislators’ party affiliations are key to their taking a view that ranges more broadly than the 
interests and opinions of their immediate constituents.”). By contrast, Richard Bellamy offers a more 
classic account of parties as mediating competing interests and helping stabilize agenda setting in the 
legislative arena. BELLAMY, supra note 11, at 236–37 (citing Michael D. McDonald, Silvia M. Mendes 
& Ian Budge, What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 1–26 
(2004)). 
 43. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF THE 
RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 89, 94–98 (London, John C. Nimmo ed., 1887). 
 44. JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 72–73 
(2016) [hereinafter WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY].  
 45. For a more theoretical grounding for bicameralism, see id. at 72–92. 
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life.46 Whether on Waldron’s account or under a thicker version of democratic 
society, we can distinguish between the process of electoral choice of governors 
and the mechanisms that steer the governors toward a respect for the dignity of 
all citizens. 
As with most accounts of democracy, Waldron begins with the central role 
of elections and the franchise.47 The participation of the citizenry in self-
governance through the electoral process sets the foundation for democracy. 
Elections allow the citizens to assess retrospectively the success of the most 
recent governors. Universal suffrage and periodic elections are elements that 
contribute to a Schumpetarian obligation of the governors to be accountable to 
the citizenry48 as well as the capacity of the citizenry to respond retroactively 
by “throwing the rascals out.”49 Indeed, for political scientists such as Adam 
Przeworski and his collaborators, the fact of having at least twice removed 
incumbent politicians by electoral means is the operational definition of 
democracy.50 The voting aspect offers citizens the renewal of consent, in 
Bernard Manin’s formulation,51 such that the continued exercise of state 
authority may assume political legitimacy. To this might be added a series of 
rights guarantees that are essential to democratic choice, including freedoms of 
speech and press, the capacity to organize political parties, and the ability to 
assemble in furtherance of political expression. This first set of principles is well 
trod in political theory and is premised on the central role of citizen voting that 
underlies any theory of democracy. These are the structural components of 
democratic governance, including the familiar separation of powers among 
branches of government that have different electoral constituencies together 
with formal rights guarantees established through constitutional design. 
Less clearly identified is the second set of preconditions. Requirements of 
bicameralism, ongoing debate, committee structures, and the like do not go to 
the process values of accountability. These are elements of a concern about 
democratic governance rather than democratic election. With the exception of 
bicameralism, these tend not to be constitutionally entrenched but emerge 
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instead from trial and error and the resulting lived institutional experience of 
particular democratic governments. Each of the listed attributes, and others 
such as filibuster rules and supermajority requirements for certain legislative 
enactments, are efforts to compel a broader consensus for governance. Elections 
serve primarily to create a momentary majority (or plurality) that will assume 
office. Rules concerning how governmental power will be exercised define the 
limits of office and the requirements of political consensus. In turn, these 
governance rules evince a substantive concern with moderation and stability in 
the discharge of governmental functions. 
Democracies allow a broad swath of private citizen behavior and 
decisionmaking. Legitimate governance offers citizens the ability to carry on 
ordering their private affairs under a knowable set of societal commitments to 
a rule of law. Ultimately, law seeks to permit the citizenry to form justifiable 
expectations about rights, security, and freedom from arbitrary state action. 
Unlike plebiscitary governance, which may permit radical swings in 
programmatic commitments, institutionalized democratic governance provides 
what James Madison hailed as the virtues of “filtration” of popular sentiment 
through institutional intermediation.52 Committee structures, bicameralism, 
staggered election cycles, federalism, and separation of powers are instruments 
that delay the implementation of momentary popular preferences until they 
command sufficient support, measured in terms of both the intensity of the 
majority commitment and its endurance over time. In the perhaps apocryphal 
exchange between George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, Washington 
likened the need for a second legislative chamber to Jefferson’s custom of 
pouring hot coffee from cup to saucer: after passage by the popularly 
accountable House, explained Washington, “we pour our legislation into the 
Senatorial saucer to cool it.”53 
From this perspective, two aims are served by submitting democratic 
governance to constitutional constraints. Constitutionalism serves to secure 
both the process values of periodic accountability and the substantive aim of 
checking the ability of a majority to get its political way too readily.54 But 
constitutional law does only part of the work. The formal structures of 
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governance, such as the composition of the legislative branch and the formal 
powers of the executive, are customarily specified in the formal writing of a 
constitution. Were a government to suspend the operation of parliament, or 
override judicial review altogether,55 there would be little question that any 
claim to democratic legitimacy would be foregone for the executive that pursues 
such a course, with or without tanks in the street. This is the narrow view of 
constitutional democracy as providing for a series of structural guarantees that 
are often the subject of judicial oversight.56 
But other important features of democratic stability are less evident, 
ranging from the internal procedures of the parliament to such measures as the 
filibuster or the “blue slip” in the American Senate, all mechanisms that should 
compel negotiation and compromise between the majority and the minority. 
These latter mechanisms go not to the core principle of electoral accountability 
but to the discharge of responsible governance. These norms of restraint form 
the “spirit” of democratic governance, to borrow from Montesquieu,57 without 
which political stability could not exist. Thus, from Waldron, we have concern 
that New Zealand’s practice of allowing a unicameral legislature strays from the 
deliberative ideal by allowing proposed legislation to be “enacted in a single 
sitting, and that means we lose the point of having successive layers of debate 
and voting, which is supposed to be a way of slowing down the enactment of a 
Bill, a kind of compulsory waiting period.”58 
The existence of the above two sets of preconditions for stable democratic 
governance does not speak for or against judicial review. These are instead 
mechanisms that temper the democratic necessity of majoritarian rule by 
diminishing the risk of the tyranny of that same majority. Among this set of 
accommodations may be found the guarantees of quality of life for all citizens 
that thicken some accounts of democratic legitimacy. The mechanisms that 
compel democracies to care for all their citizens, including those unable to 
prevail in the electoral arena, may be thought of as the “soft power” of a 
constitutional democracy. For classic thinkers like Montesquieu, “[T]he hard 
architecture of political institutions might be enough to constrain overreaching 
power—that constitutional design was not unlike an engineering problem 
. . . .”59 In practice, however, successful democracies embroider the hard 
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architecture with a series of norms and institutionalized practices that slow 
down the risk of partisan exuberance and allow for stable governance over time 
and over shifting election results. 
B. Real Democracies 
The procedures and conditions that emerge from how democracies 
actually work are the “guardrails” of modern democratic governance, in 
Levitsky and Ziblatt’s useful formulation,60 that provide important constraints 
on majoritarian excess far beyond the formal structures of constitutionally 
mandated institutions. Indeed, the erosion of such soft power in the face of 
plebiscite-like demands for the immediate satisfaction of majoritarian demands 
may be the greatest contemporary threat to democracy. With the weakness of 
the legislative branches and the rise of the executive, these “guardrails” may 
prove vulnerable to the populist wave, which in critical ways overwhelms the 
customary limitations on the exercise of constitutional power. These guardrails 
are somewhat evident in the selection process that defines democratic culture. 
But there are further guardrails that check the exercise of democratic authority 
by those elected in such a way as to restrain extremism. When these customary 
limits and conditions are threatened, as they often are in the messy and second-
best realm of lived experience, the question of what to do next cannot be 
answered by assuming the threats do not exist. 
As I have addressed elsewhere,61 the cooling function of legislative debate 
and accommodation is in disrepair, and institutional checks on temptations for 
momentary excess must come from elsewhere. Renata Uitz explains that 
executive power grows when legislatures fail to exercise this cooling function 
and resolve difficult questions: 
The powers of the executive branch to execute the laws . . . are neither 
self-standing, nor self-explanatory. Rather they are part of a complex 
web of legislative and executive powers, mended by the judiciary and 
extended by the political branches based on practical needs, fears, and 
personal ambitions. Complexity leads to complication and complications 
are left unresolved under the banner of being (too) complex. This 
becomes the convenient source of unstoppable executive overreach.62 
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Modern democracies are almost invariably commanded from above by 
executive authority. In contemporary politics, the risk of undermining norms 
of governance comes not only from populist insurgents around the world but 
also from the breakdown of legislatively focused politics. Morris Fiorina 
compellingly establishes that, in the context of U.S. politics—“given the 
American constitutional system with its separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and federalism—a party would have to win and retain an 
overwhelming majority to implement its platform given all the veto points that 
can be utilized by the opposition.”63 From this, Fiorina concludes that “[f]ailure 
to win and hold such . . . majorities produces the stalemate and gridlock that 
characterize contemporary politics.”64 
Perhaps. But looking away from the legislative arena, where indeed 
stalemate and gridlock reign, the actual exercise of political power looks more 
complicated. Fiorina grounds his analysis in the failure of the legislative branch 
to play its suited role. The historic premise of the constitutional democracies of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the primacy of the legislative branch, 
denominated by the Article I power in the U.S. setting. Legislative weakness 
invites capture of government authority by the executive, a tendency for policy 
to be initiated through regulation or decree rather than legislation. These 
executive-dominated governments look to elections as a mandate rather than as 
the normal process of parliamentary ups and downs.65 And these executives see 
the legislature as an obstacle to moving ahead with executive prerogatives. A 
legislature that does not deliver risks being overwhelmed by the executive 
branch. It does not matter that legislative inaction may result from the 
fracturing of the political parties capable of negotiating for the public good, the 
sheer dysfunction of the legislature, a political disagreement with the agenda of 
the executive, or the inability to cohere on a policy initiative in the face of 
internal political disagreement. An executive riding a populist wave would not 
distinguish among the sources of legislative inaction and would instead see each 
sign of legislative reprobation as an unwarranted threat to the executive’s 
electoral mandate. 
Without the primacy of legislative authority, the legitimacy and support 
of democratic governance erodes. The ensuing period of “democratic decline” 
allows a populist leader to launch “a concerted and sustained attack on 
institutions whose job it is to check his actions or on rules that hold him to 
account.”66 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, such a populist leader “does so in 
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the name of his democratic mandate. Loosening the bonds of constitutional 
constraint on executive power through legal reform is the first sign of the 
autocratic legalist.”67 
Separating the functions of democratic election from democratic 
governance highlights the risk posed by legislative decline. Running a successful 
democracy is not simply a matter of getting elected but of delivering the goods, 
of getting things done well. Governments must frequently trade off the 
immediate satisfaction of demands for the long-term good, whether in 
infrastructure investments, in wartime privation, or in not indulging in 
inflationary monetary expansion. The processes of electoral accountability 
speak primarily to government formation and re-formation. But successful 
governance is a longer project and state capabilities develop over time. The 
epistemic challenge to wise democratic stewardship is not a matter of electoral 
accountability alone but of institutionalized state competence that must at times 
resist or cool the temporary ardor of the electorate.68 
Institutional failure invites erosion of democratic norms through efforts to 
circumvent the process accountability aspects of democratic election or through 
efforts to unwind the institutional constraints that accompany successful 
democratic governance. This leads to the core of the argument for judicial 
scrutiny as a check in periods of democratic decline. The case for judicial 
intervention is more apparent in the case of efforts to defeat the structural 
protections of democratic accountability. Whether the judiciary can restore the 
guardrails of democratic governance is a harder question. And, finally, there is 
the question whether, once the boundary is crossed for the judicial mandate to 
include questions of governance, there is a stopping point short of judicial 
claims to oversee the policy outcomes that ensue. Once the assumption of 
properly functioning legislative supremacy is relaxed, the leading arguments 
against judicial review stumble badly when measured against the unfortunately 
imperfect real world. 
II.  BASIC STRUCTURES AT PERIL 
In the manner that foxes should not be posted at the henhouse door, so it 
is that deference to the legislative process cannot serve as the answer to 
systematic assaults on the process of electoral accountability.69 There may be 
great dignity, at least ideally, in the deliberation offered in the legislative 
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setting. But there is no dignity in an argument among a band of thieves about 
how to divide the spoils of rapacious plunder. 
There is a lurking empirical claim in the debate about judicial review. 
Critics are most comfortable positing the dignity of the legislative process 
abstracted from the messiness of contemporary politics. Yet they nonetheless 
are quick to point to legislative successes in matters such as Britain or Ireland 
legislating a right to abortion as proof of the superiority of the parliamentary 
route.70 And it may be that under certain circumstances, for those seeking such 
social reforms, that “the British constitution provide[s] one of the best 
opportunities for this to be done, particularly after the introduction of universal 
suffrage and the reform of the House of Lords in 1911 and 1949 . . . . [T]here 
were no institutional restraints on a legally sovereign legislature and a politically 
sovereign electorate.”71 But where democracy yields one-party domination 
along with ease of constitutional amendment, the historic legacy of 
parliamentary sovereignty does not appear so rosy. For every Britain, there is a 
Hungary or Poland or South Africa or India, as this Article develops below. 
Nonetheless, it is hard to take issue with the general proposition that the 
legislature is the preferred democratic route to govern in a democratically 
legitimate system. It is so evident as to appear tautological. But cherry-picking 
examples from political history fails to answer two questions that must be 
addressed once the debate is moved from the premises of first principles to the 
nasty world of human reality. First, how representative are these cases of 
legislative self-repair amid the broad swath of experience under the imperfect 
democracies that populate the world? And, second and more critically, what 
happens when it is the political branches of government that threaten 
democratic legitimacy? 
A. Taiwan 
Let me offer a clear example of democracy-enhancing judicial intervention 
from Taiwan. For much of its post-1949 existence, Taiwan was an unresponsive, 
dominant-party state controlled and coerced by the Kuomintang (“KMT”).72 
The democratization reforms of the 1980s allowed for some weak forms of 
electoral contestation but always under the control of the KMT, which 
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remained as dominant as before.73 All this began to change as the KMT’s grip 
on Taiwanese politics began to slip in the face of the first serious political 
challenges in the late 1990s. As established political power waned, the dominant 
legislative parties in 1999 tried to cement their hold on power by passing a 
constitutional amendment allowing them to, in effect, bypass electoral 
accountability.74 Among the lock-in provisions put into effect were two that 
stand out as an affront to any system of electoral representation. First, all 
elections for the National Assembly, the constitutional chamber of the 
bicameral legislature, beginning in 2000 were to be put off for two years—a 
process by which the legislature voted itself a respite from electoral 
accountability.75 Second, the seats in the National Assembly were to be 
guaranteed to the parties with representation in the lower chamber (the 
Legislative Yuan), without any direct election—a form of party entrenchment 
again removed from electoral accountability.76 And, as if to confirm the 
collusive nature of the power grab, the legislators were permitted to vote for 
these changes anonymously—thereby undermining the accountability that 
ensues from parliamentary public debate and voting.77 
Having removed a large core of political power from democratic 
contestation, there was no realistic prospect of a legislative solution. The 
legislature that had just voted to keep the voters at bay was unlikely to restore 
its own electoral accountability. What then of the prospect for judicial review? 
As is often the case in dominant-party states, the Taiwan Constitutional Court 
had remained generally passive throughout the period of exclusive KMT rule.78 
And even as electoral competition began to stir in the 1990s, the court steered 
clear of any direct engagement with political power, except at the invitation of 
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the ruling party and then primarily for managing internal conflict.79 All this 
changed abruptly in early 2000 when, for the first time, a non-KMT candidate 
won the presidency and ushered in an era of full political competition. As 
happens in many national settings, contested politics allowed the Judicial Yuan 
more latitude in resisting dominant-party efforts to lock itself in power.80 The 
Constitutional Court wasted no time seizing upon the fact of genuine political 
competition to assert its role as the guardian of democratic institutions.81 
Within days of the presidential election, the Constitutional Court issued its 
decisive ruling in Interpretation No. 499, striking down the legislative efforts 
at self-entrenchment despite the acts taking the form of a formal constitutional 
amendment.82 Interpretation No. 499 is the first and only time Taiwan’s 
Constitutional Court has invalidated a constitutional amendment.83 
Regarding the process, the Constitutional Court noted that the 
constitution’s “amendment greatly affects the stability of constitutional order 
and the well-being of all people as a whole and, therefore, must be done by the 
authorized [governmental] body in accordance with constitutional due 
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process.”84 The court concluded that the amendment’s passage was not 
conducted in a transparent and open manner and that its passage entailed 
several “clear” and “gross” procedural flaws: 
The provisions of the Amendment to the Constitution, as passed by the 
National Assembly in the pre-dawn hours of September 4, 1999, were 
voted upon in the Second and Third Readings by anonymous ballots, 
which violated the procedure for constitutional amendments. Moreover, 
the voting process had major flaws and was clearly erroneous because the 
very same provisions had already been voted down during the Second 
Reading but were brought up again in the Third Reading in a direct 
violation of the parliamentary rules.85 
Critically, the opinion did not stop with certain procedural improprieties 
in the rushed effort to immunize a failing political order from electoral 
accountability. The court also reviewed the amendment’s substantive 
conformity with the pre-existing Constitution and held that 
[a]lthough the Amendment to the Constitution has equal status with the 
constitutional provisions, any amendment that alters the existing 
constitutional provisions concerning the fundamental nature of 
governing norms and order and, hence, the foundation of the 
Constitution’s very existence destroys the integrity and fabric of the 
Constitution itself. As a result, such an amendment shall be deemed 
improper.86 
The court found in the lack of electoral oversight the critical constitutional 
failing, ruling as impermissible “any amendment designed to alter existing 
constitutional provisions concerning the fundamental nature of governing 
norms and order” that would compromise “the integrity and fabric of the 
Constitution itself.”87 At bottom, the court held, “delegates must be directly 
elected by the people to exercise the powers and duties of the National 
Assembly,” and absent such election, “the amended provisions on the 
installation of National Assembly delegates violate the constitutional order of 
democracy.”88 
The efforts of incumbent powers to use legislation to thwart political 
challenge is hardly new or confined to Taiwan. Numerous international parallels 
can be drawn showing the propensity for those in power to insulate themselves 
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from electoral accountability. The American experience with gerrymandering 
is one manifestation but is hardly the most pernicious. Alexander Kirshner uses 
the 1951 South African law banning voting by “colored voters” to introduce the 
problem of capture of democratic processes for antidemocratic aims.89 A South 
African court bravely resisted the National Party and held the law 
unconstitutional, only to have its efforts overwhelmed by the apartheid reforms 
of the constitution.90 
In the face of shutting down part of the electoral process as in Taiwan, or 
excluding internal opponents from the political process altogether, it is hard to 
argue for the “dignity” of the legislative process, to borrow Waldron’s term.91 
At a minimum, a thin defense of democracy is the avoidance of civil war because 
the losers of today can emerge victorious in a subsequent electoral round.92 
In Taiwan, no such deference to parliament may attach in the case of an 
incumbent legislative majority that has used its power to suspend elections, 
turned the constitutional chamber into a permanent fiefdom, and thereby 
eliminated the electoral accountability that must form the core of any claim to 
democratic legitimacy. As even Bellamy must concede, under such 
circumstances, all bets are off: “If matters did indeed get so bad that the 
democratic system could no longer claim to be either credibly representative of 
political opinion or responsible and accountable for central matters of public 
policy, then it would cease to possess the constitutional credentials described 
here.”93 At its most basic, once elections are suspended or eliminated, it is 
impossible to claim that there remain “incentives for incumbents to address a 
wide range of disparate concerns in order to build a broad coalition of 
supporters.”94 
B. India 
The aim in this Article is not to catalogue the many parallel judicial 
interventions around the world. But India does deserve special mention because 
of the impact its Supreme Court has had on emerging democracies around the 
world. The Indian “basic structures” doctrine was an early resistance to the 
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reaches of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s emergency measures.95 In 
articulating the internationally influential doctrine, the Indian Supreme Court 
placed certain core constitutional protections, including the right of judicial 
review, beyond the reach of not only ordinary legislation but also of the process 
of constitutional amendment itself.96 The nation’s Supreme Court concluded 
that its review of proposed amendments for conformity with its constitution’s 
basic structures is an implied limit on the legislature’s amendment power.97 In 
using this new power to resist the state of emergency and one-party rule, the 
basic structures doctrine “introduced the world to the idea of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment, a domain of values so central to democratic 
governance that alteration was beyond even the power of the constitutional 
amendment process.”98 
When the government attempted to place constitutional amendments 
beyond judicial review,99 the Indian Supreme Court then held the legislature 
could not grant itself unlimited power to amend the constitution and that the 
Supreme Court was competent to review amendments to determine whether 
they were so radical as to destroy the constitution’s basic structures and thus 
amount to a change greater than a mere “amendment.”100 
The basic structures doctrine has been employed not only in response to 
attempts to limit the Indian Supreme Court’s power but also in response to 
amendments aiming to entrench executive power and evade electoral 
accountability.101 For example, after the High Court of Allahabad found Indira 
Gandhi, the recently elected prime minister, guilty of corrupt election practices 
and barred her from holding office or running for reelection for a period of six 
years,102 then-President Fakhrudeen Ali Ahmad declared a state of emergency, 
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and the government passed an amendment that would have given Parliament 
power to regulate elections, including the basis for judicial challenges of 
elections, and would render previous legal proceedings adjudicated under the 
old laws void.103 The amendment was challenged in the Supreme Court of 
India.104 The court held that the amendment and emergency measures were 
impermissible because they violated core principles like democracy and free and 
fair elections, which are integral to the constitution’s overall design.105 Since its 
early development in India, the basic structures doctrine, and other 
substantially similar judicial doctrines, have been used by courts in India and 
around the world to protect against both attacks on the powers of constitutional 
courts and attacks on democratic processes more broadly. 
C. Emerging Democracies 
Preserving the core basic structures of democratic accountability provided 
the organizing principle for a dramatic series of decisions in recent years in 
which apex courts have struck down even procedurally proper constitutional 
amendments. The Colombian Supreme Court successfully rejected the 
excessive concentration of executive power when President Uribe tried to 
amend the constitution to allow himself a third term.106 Eastern European 
courts slowed the process of political exclusion of governmental enemies 
through lustration laws and language requirements for representation in 
parliament.107 The list goes on, and the scholarship on judicial intervention in 
such fragile or compromised democracies has become substantial in recent 
years.108 At its most far-reaching, constitutional courts have developed a 
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doctrinal framework for rejecting “unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments” that, even if presented in a procedurally proper manner, so 
challenge the integrity of further democratic accountability as to be rejected on 
that basis.109 
The Indian Supreme Court’s doctrine of preserving the basic structures of 
democratic accountability then provides the framework for the assertion of 
judicial challenges to one-party rule in countries like Malaysia, which again, as 
in Taiwan, corresponded to the fracturing of the ruling party’s lock-hold on 
power.110 In Malaysia, the Federal Court (the constitutional high court) even 
ventured into the fraught area of religious authority, declaring that judicial 
review and constitutional interpretation are “pivotal constituents of the civil 
courts’ judicial power” and that “[a]s part of the basic structure of the 
constitution, it cannot be abrogated from the civil courts or conferred upon the 
Syariah Courts, whether by constitutional amendments, Act of Parliament or 
state legislation.”111 As with the initial formulation of the basic structures 
doctrine in India, and as repeated in many invocations around the world, the 
Malaysian Federal Court proclaimed its basic structure to invalidate a 
constitutional amendment that would have stripped the judiciary of the power 
to review and invalidate certain categories of legislation.112 
Categorical critics of judicial review tend not to address the problem of 
the “third wave”113 of democracy formation in which the background in 
autocracy or ethnic conflict yields deeply imperfect democratic institutions. 
Bellamy, for example, simply posits away all the work of modern democracies 
in forging a democratic polity.114 In his view, political failure “tend[s] to arise 
out of resistance by certain territorially based cultural, religious, ethnic and 
socio-economic minorities to rule by a national majority.”115 In these situations, 
“the absence of a common political identity with their fellow citizens within the 
cultural majority may undercut a minority’s ability to form alliances with them 
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on particular policy areas.”116 This domain is then excised from the argument on 
judicial review.117 
In the actual world of beleaguered democratic institutions, one cannot 
simply posit away the difficult question of judicial intervention to preserve 
democratic institutions and the prospect for electoral accountability. Not 
surprisingly, resurgent autocratic rulers frequently find comfort in attacking 
any accountability to judicial review.118 Holding political power becomes the 
repudiation to judicially imposed constraints on legislative prerogatives.119 As 
urged by Polish de facto head of state Jaroslaw Kaczynski, “In a democracy, the 
sovereign is the people, their representative in Parliament and, in the Polish 
case, the elected president . . . . If we are to have a democratic state of law, no 
state authority, including the Constitutional Tribunal, can disregard 
legislation.”120 Kaczynski rules from behind a commanding parliamentary 
majority, dispensing with the pretense of even holding any formal position 
other than being a Member of Parliament.121 From that perch, he has 
 
 116. Id. at 234. 
 117. Id. at 233–34. 
 118. See, e.g., Marc Santora, Amid Growing Uproar, Poland to Remove 27 Supreme Court Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-supreme-court-
judiciary.html [https://perma.cc/MQ5S-ESQW (dark archive)] [hereinafter Santora, Amid Growing 
Uproar] (detailing how Poland’s governing party harassed, threatened, and removed opposing members 
of the Supreme Court). In fairness, it is also possible that an autocrat may capture the judiciary to 
impose commanding rule, as occurred in Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro used the Venezuelan 
Supreme Court to, in effect, shut down Congress after the opposition surprisingly prevailed in 
elections. See Nicholas Casey & Patricia Torres, Venezuela Muzzles Legislature, Moving Closer to One-
Man Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/americas/
venezuelas-supreme-court-takes-power-from-legislature.html [https://perma.cc/7DRP-S7VJ (dark 
archive)] (describing the court’s unprecedented decision to suspend the National Assembly); Hannah 
Strange, Venezuela Supreme Court Blocks Opposition’s Parliamentary Super-Majority in ‘Judicial Coup’, 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica
/venezuela/12076970/Venezuela-Supreme-Court-blocks-oppositions-parliamentary-super-majority-
in-judicial-coup.html [https://perma.cc/7X5M-AN5K (dark archive)] (relating the court’s decision not 
to seat three opposition legislators on the basis of supposed voting irregularities, thus denying the 
opposition a supermajority). As a general matter, the courts are more difficult to capture because of the 
time lag of judicial appointments. This is particularly so in parliamentary systems in which the head of 
government typically is also head of the commanding legislative majority. Cf. Charles H. Koch, Jr., 
Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 66 (2003) (noting that “the key separation 
in the parliamentary system . . . is between the democratic institutions of government and the 
judiciary”); Yvonne Tew, On the Uneven Journey to Constitutional Redemption: The Malaysian Judiciary 
and Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 673, 678 (2016) (noting that the Malaysian judiciary’s 
position in its 1988 standoff vis-à-vis the executive was seriously weakened by the fact that it was a 
parliamentary system in which the “executive and legislature maintain[ed] a strong control over 
government power”). 
 119. See, e.g., Casey & Torres, supra note 118 (describing how when the legislature attempted to 
restrain Maduro, he used his supporters on the Venezuelan Supreme Court to overrule them). 
 120. Santora, Amid Growing Uproar, supra note 118. 
 121. See Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional 
Populist Backsliding 10 n.45 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018), 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019) 
26 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
successfully dismantled the Polish Constitutional Court, purged much of the 
Supreme Court, and forced the constitution increasingly to bend to one-party 
rule.122 
The role of courts in resisting democratic backsliding in weak democratic 
states is the subject of my monograph on Fragile Democracies,123 an argument 
that I do not wish to rehearse here. Instead, the aim here is to push the 
boundaries of the arguments over judicial review beyond the context of 
unconsolidated democracies as such. The pressures of institutional weakness or 
design defects in established democracies brings the elements of fragility to the 
fore even in cases that would meet the narrow boundaries of proper democracies 
identified by Waldron and Bellamy. The experience of strong constitutional 
courts in emergent democracies helps clarify a form of judicial intervention that 
addresses not the output of the legislative process, nor the rights of individual 
citizens as such, but the integrity of the democratic process that conditions 
lawmaking. But the extreme frailty of nascent democracies may reveal a 
generalizable tension in democratic self-government. In short, the claim is not 
that the world is divided between fragile democracies and a handful of stable 
ones, mostly emerging from the remnants of the British Empire. Instead, the 
argument is that all democracies may become fragile under excessive pressure 
on the structural preconditions for democratic governance, at least at times. 
D. The Democratic Heartland 
While extreme, the examples from Taiwan or Eastern Europe or India 
have a resonance in even the established democratic countries. There are 
temptations for incumbent authorities to either bypass the formal accountability 
structures that limit their immediate power (George Washington’s “cooling” 
function)124 or to thwart the electoral mechanisms that, having brought them to 
office, might well lead to their removal. Richard Pildes and I have referred to 
the problem of “lockups” on power by incumbents as a major justification for 
judicial intervention and also as a guiding principle for distinguishing 
democracy-reinforcement from mere policy imposition by the judiciary.125 
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When the American Supreme Court ventured into the “political thicket” 
in the Reapportionment Cases of the 1960s,126 it was the failure of electoral 
accountability that provided the key doctrinal justification,127 as it later proved 
to be in Taiwan.128 The core fact of the political question cases of the 1960s was 
that the American political establishment refused to reapportion political power 
from 1910 on.129 As the population grew, urbanized, and welcomed new 
generations of immigrants, the act of reapportionment would shift political 
power from rural America to the numerical strongholds of an urbanizing, 
integrating nation. Even Congress, despite an express constitutional duty to 
reapportion after every decennial Census, refused to do so after the 1920 
Census, 130 which confirmed the rise of the urban, industrial North.131 Absolute 
power loves power, absolutely. 
As the twentieth century progressed, the refusal to reapportion meant that 
some counties had representation sixty times as great, indeed even one hundred 
times as great, as other counties on a per person basis.132 Even though one 
person, one vote was not yet enshrined as constitutional doctrine, there was no 
question that the intuitive principle of equal shares among voters was in grave 
disrepair. Ultimately what foundered the political question doctrine was the 
sheer futility of seeking political redress for a political power grab. In the 
seminal case of Baker v. Carr,133 Justice Tom Clark perfectly captured the 
absurdity of a legislative solution: 
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal 
Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by this Court into 
so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the people of 
Tennessee. . . . I find none other than through the federal courts. The 
majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket. 
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Tennessee has an ‘informed, civically militant electorate’ and ‘an aroused 
popular conscience,’ but it does not sear ‘the conscience of the people’s 
representatives.’ This is because the legislative policy has riveted the 
present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and by 
the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment of any kind is 
prevented. . . . We therefore must conclude that the people of Tennessee 
are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the 
present discrimination in the affairs of their state government.134 
Most often, the cases that command attention are judicial interventions 
when the legislature has acted perniciously, as with the Taiwanese power grab, 
or the South African exclusion of “colored voters,” or the declaration of 
emergency powers in India.135 More complicated than a power grab through 
legislative action is legislative refusal to act and a corresponding lack of political 
accountability before the electorate. One of the obstacles to entering the 
political thicket to confront the refusal to reapportion was the generalized legal 
difficulty with acts of omission versus acts of commission. Yet legislative 
passivity in the face of consolidating power may also be the occasion for critical 
judicial intervention. 
Brexit offers an instructive example. Each of the major parties was and 
still is deeply divided on the question of European integration, immigration, 
EU regulatory authority, and a number of subsidiary issues at the heart of 
British political divides.136 The result was an ill-considered referendum. In 
effect, this was a desperate gambit by a weak prime minister to compensate for 
lack of parliamentary leadership to take charge of an explosive political issue. 
The avoidance strategy was to stage a direct appeal to the population. Prime 
Minister David Cameron, like many failing politicians, misjudged the times and 
was repudiated by the voters. Cameron quickly departed the scene, and a 
chastened and ultimately unstable Tory government formed under Prime 
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Minister Theresa May, who in turn was replaced by Boris Johnson in an as-yet-
unresolved crisis of constitutional proportions.137 
Unable or unwilling to resist the wave of populist anger, the new 
government announced its intention to implement the Brexit vote as the voice 
of the people. The result was an attempt to disentangle Britain from the EU by 
executive fiat. This provoked a major legal challenge in the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom, now formally disengaged from the House of Lords. The 
Miller case prompted a remarkable discussion on the nature of British 
democratic governance and the importance of institutional order. The inquiry 
was thus: [The] Act envisages domestic law, and therefore rights of UK citizens, 
changing as EU law varies, but it does not envisage those rights changing as a 
result of ministers unilaterally deciding that the United Kingdom should 
withdraw from the EU Treaties.138 
That a weak government had appealed directly over the head of Parliament to 
enraged voters did not alter the institutional commitments to the democratic 
supremacy of Parliament. Nor could the Prime Minister invoke plebiscitary 
approval as a substitute for proper institutional process: 
The question is whether that domestic starting point, introduced by 
Parliament, can be set aside, or could have been intended to be set aside, 
by a decision of the UK executive without express Parliamentary 
authorisation. We cannot accept that a major change to UK 
constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone; it must 
be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely 
by Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow 
from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to 
the present issue.139 
Undoubtedly, there would ultimately have been political retribution for the 
entire Brexit imbroglio, including on Prime Minister May. Perhaps in the 
absence of judicial intervention, the parliamentary leadership would have paid 
the price for any ensuing dislocations and its failure to discharge the leadership 
responsibilities under Britain’s parliamentary constitution. But in the 
immediate political moment, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom forced 
a political accounting. The court’s intervention did not predetermine either the 
ultimate decision on Brexit or substitute for the political accountability of 
Parliament. Instead, in a fashion that borders on the soft power of democracy, 
the limited intervention aimed to reinforce the constitutional constraints 
necessary for democratic governance. 
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III.  THE SOFT POWER OF DEMOCRACY 
Beyond the formal commands of electoral accountability stand the norms 
of democratic governance that exercise a soft power over successive generations 
of governors. Mostly these norms are boundaries of constraint as citizens and 
governors come to internalize the critical elements of democracy: the acceptance 
of the legitimacy of an opposition, the prospect that results will vary from 
election to election, and the institutional limitations that provide for continuity 
in the lived experiences of the citizenry. Just as no successful society can rely 
on the express sanctions of law alone, no democracy can survive unless certain 
norms of continuity and restraint in governance are accepted by the political 
class. The idea of “regulated rivalry” between legitimate adversaries dampens 
the risk of upheavals and violence in favor of “the legitimacy of ongoing, 
managed, institutionalized conflict.”140 
A. Soft Power Under Threat 
The institutional pathways of democratic governance serve to slow 
demands for immediate satisfaction of the momentary majority. Such delayed 
gratification frustrates populist insurgents for whom institutional constraints 
are seen as an impediment. To the tempering effect of institutionalized political 
parties come the independent, charismatic candidates increasingly untethered 
to any governmental experience. To the labored processes of administrative 
procedure come the demands for draining the swamp.141 To the separation of 
prosecutorial power from direct political commands comes the chant of “lock 
her up.”142 And, to the difficulty of working the legislative byways comes the 
recourse to executive decrees.143 In large measure, these are the frustrations of 
political immediacy that bedevil every new administration in every democracy. 
The ship of state is cumbersome and alters course hesitatingly. 
 
 140. NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND 
PARTISANSHIP 121 (2008) (invoking Edmund Burke’s framing of parties as regulated rivals). 
 141. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:41 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/811975049431416832 [https://perma.cc/DPT4-
PZT3?type=image] (“Someone incorrectly stated that the phrase “DRAIN THE SWAMP” was no 
longer being used by me. Actually, we will always be trying to DTS.”); Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1129340814080040961 [https://perma.cc/T5DP-
6CAC?type=image] (“DRAIN THE SWAMP!”).  
 142. See Peter W. Stevenson, A Brief History of the ‘Lock Her Up!’ Chant by Trump Supporters Against 
Clinton, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/11/22/a-brief-history-of-the-lock-her-up-chant-as-it-looks-like-trump-might-not-even-
try/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/Y2J4-5R97 (dark archive)].   
 143. The populist frustration with the norms of democratic governance is examined more fully in 
Samuel Issacharoff, Populism Versus Democratic Governance, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN 
CRISIS?, supra note 122, at 445, 445–58 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Populism versus Democratic Governance]. 
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1.  United States 
More is at stake at present than the normal difficulties of governing. There 
is no escaping the efforts made to foreclose any possibility that the political 
opposition might reverse the electoral trend. In North Carolina, for example, 
the governorship has shifted pretty steadily between Republicans and 
Democrats since the partisan realignment of the late 1960s.144 But in the most 
recent such shift in 2017, Republicans used their legislative majority to attempt 
to neuter the office of the governor altogether, thereby depriving the elected 
Democrat of traditional powers of appointment and various normal trappings 
of executive office.145 As with all classic lockups, the aim is to consolidate past 
electoral gains and eliminate the capacity for political opponents to realize 
power by changing the rules of the game.146 Thus, in December 2016, less than 
two weeks before the swearing in of Democratic Governor-elect Roy Cooper, 
the Republican-controlled North Carolina General Assembly passed a 
significant package of restrictions on the powers of the governor, reducing the 
number of state employees that the governor could appoint from 1500 to 425, 
stripping the gubernatorial power to appoint a majority to the influential State 
Board of Elections, requiring that appointments to the governor’s cabinet be 
subject to approval by the Republican-controlled state Senate, and significantly 
stripping the jurisdiction of the Democratic-controlled state supreme court.147 
This process was put to a halt by the state supreme court,148 which ruled that 
the legislation obstructed the governor’s ability to ensure the laws were 
faithfully executed.149 Not easily deterred, the General Assembly then presented 
multiple amendments to the state constitution, aiming to frustrate any exercise 
of customary gubernatorial powers by a Democrat.150 
 
 144. Former North Carolina Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/former-
governors/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/EEJ2-HPSY].   
 145. See generally Trip Gabriel, North Carolina G.O.P. Moves to Curb Power of New Democratic 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/us/politics/north-
carolina-governor-roy-cooper-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/BT8L-Y5L3 (dark archive)] 
(detailing the North Carolina Republican Party’s attempts to strip power from the Governor). 
 146. For an overview of the persistent manipulations of election rules to consolidate Republican 
gains, see generally Michael Kent Curtis, North Carolina’s Sick Democracy: Racial Gerrymanders, 
Political Gerrymanders, and Voting Rules as Tools for Partisan Entrenchment (Sept. 11, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247292 
[https://perma.cc/GM8P-6XMN].  
 147. Richard Fausset, North Carolina Governor Signs Law Limiting Successor’s Power, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/us/pat-mccrory-roy-cooper-north-carolina.html 
[https://perma.cc/D7XZ-MAML (dark archive)]. 
 148. Cooper v. Berger, 370 N.C. 392, 422, 809 S.E.2d 98, 116 (2018). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Dave Hendrickson, Here’s a Look at North Carolina’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 
WRAL (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.wral.com/here-s-a-look-at-north-carolina-s-proposed-
constitutional-amendments/17715772/ [https://perma.cc/G28V-E5WD] (detailing the proposed 
amendments). 
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At the national level, one of the founders of the Federalist Society 
advocated seizing the advantage of a Republican President and Congress to 
increase by a factor of 2.5 the number of federal appellate judges, ram through 
appointments, and seal the judiciary as a Republican keepsake for a generation 
or more.151 And at the executive level, the norms against presidential 
engagement with criminal investigations have been lost to repeated demands 
by President Trump for the prosecution of everyone from Hillary Clinton to 
current and former government officials who have aroused presidential ire.152 
In the United States and abroad, politics have shifted from the mediating 
institutional framework of parties to individual-based campaigns with a 
decidedly plebiscitary air. One rather extreme variant is found in Italy, in which 
an antigovernance group without a policy platform is allied with a right-wing 
party rooted in anti-immigrant sentiment.153 To this may be added the radical 
overhaul of post-1989 institutions in Hungary and Poland and the repeated 
efforts in each to dismantle the judiciary as a source of resistance.154 
 
 151. See Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill 15–18 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. 
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 17-24, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ5J-WHSV] (calling 
for a significant increase in federal circuit judges). 
 152. Peter Baker, ‘Lock Her Up’ Becomes More Than a Slogan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/us/politics/trump-pressure-clinton-investigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/CZ4D-A5AH (dark archive)]; John T. Bennett, Trump Urges Sessions to Investigate 
His Political Foes, ROLL CALL (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-urges-
sessions-to-investigate-his-political-foes [https://perma.cc/4UHK-KBEZ]; Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2017, 3:57 AM), 
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going on with Crooked Hillary & the Dems.. [sic]”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1060155917059219461 
[https://perma.cc/M8CZ-CLUZ] (“If the Democrats think they are going to waste Taxpayer Money 
investigating us at the House level, then we will likewise be forced to consider investigating them for 
all of the leaks of Classified Information, and much else, at the Senate level. Two can play that game!”). 
 153. See Alexander Stille, Not So Funny, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2018), 
http://alexanderstille.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Not-So-Funny-by-Alexander-Stille-The-New-
York-Review-of-Books-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7GZ-SG4Z].  
 154. See Patrick Kingsley, After Viktor Orban’s Victory, Hungary’s Judges Start to Tumble, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-judges.html 
[https://perma.cc/K3ST-FNR8 (dark archive)]; Marc Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court, and 
Protesters Take to Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/
world/europe/poland-supreme-court-protest.html [https://perma.cc/5JJM-P3JN (dark archive)] 
[hereinafter Santora, Poland Purges Supreme Court]. For a more extensive account of the recent illiberal 
changes to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s 
Constitutional Revolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: 
THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 111, 111–24 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál 
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2.  Poland and Hungary 
The experiences in Poland and Hungary certainly cast doubt on the 
ultimate judicial capacity to intercede successfully on behalf of the soft power 
of democracy. Each case presents a threat to democracy from within 
recognizable processes and institutions of democratic governance, as opposed to 
the sudden appearance of tanks on the streets. In this sense, it is important to 
distinguish the risks of illiberal democracies155 of the twenty-first century from 
the military diktat states of the past century. The presumptive legitimacy of 
elections, even under compromised conditions, deters the more overt challenges 
to civilian rule.156 At the same time, the hard challenges, particularly in the face 
of anti-institutional populist sentiment, do not so often concern the formal use 
of dramatic constitutional changes, as in Taiwan.157 Rather, more common is a 
process of democratic backsliding that occurs when a democratically elected 
government uses lawful tools to manipulate rules and institutions in order to 
retain power. Instead of high voltage constitutional amendments, the tools of 
“ordinary constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation” 
may be the key levers to further “these abuses of public power.”158 
Consider the experience in Poland since the Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
won a legislative majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections. The national 
judiciary proved a substantial impediment to the consolidation of power by the 
controlling legislative coalition159—a playbook that readily extends from North 
Carolina to Venezuela and beyond. Through a series of steps, including refusing 
to fund the publication of Constitutional Tribunal decisions and then flooding 
the court with new loyalist appointees, PiS loyalists numbered nine out of the 
fifteen members of the tribunal, including its president and vice president.160 
The subversion of legal authority was accomplished by avoiding a single, 
comprehensive constitutional amendment and working relatively slowly and 
 
 155. See generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997, 
at 22, 22 (coining the term “illiberal democracy” and describing the problem of “[d]emocratically 
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 157. See supra Section II.A. 
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 160. PIOTR BURAS & GERALD KNAUS, BATORY FOUND., WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE 




98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019) 
34 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
through highly technical and procedural maneuvers.161 Wojciech Sadurski 
argues that this set of moves “produces a cumulative effect” in which the “whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts.”162 Each step was calculated to “ensure that 
next phases would sail through without any scrutiny.”163 Far from satisfied, in 
early July 2018, the PiS forced the retirement of twenty-seven of the seventy-
two Supreme Court justices, including the top judge, through a law that requires 
judges to retire at age sixty-five unless they gain a personal reprieve from 
President Andrzej Duda, who has sole discretion over this retirement 
provision.164 
One need only look to Hungary to see the anticipated path in Poland. In 
2010, with fifty-three percent of the popular vote, Prime Minister Viktor 
Orban’s government seized sixty-eight percent of the seats in Parliament.165 
This two-thirds supermajority allowed the unicameral parliament to 
fundamentally rewrite the 1989–1990 Constitution and to pass large blocks of 
legislation challenging the independence of the judiciary, the media, the 
prosecutor’s office, the tax authority, and the election commission, as well as 
extending the reach of governmental power into civil society institutions.166 Key 
here as well was the neutering of the judiciary through forced retirements, 
harassment, and outright threats. 167 All these incremental moves had the 
combined effect of neutering the customary forms of opposition from within 
the political process. The result was an increasingly isolated and weakened 
judiciary trying to constrain the concentration of power in an increasingly 
despotic executive. 
B. Judicial Intervention 
The path to judicial invalidation of specific laws abrogating the structures 
of democracy is well established, if difficult to execute successfully. Judicial 
 
 161. Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness?, supra note 122, at 576. For a comprehensive 
account of the systematic assault on constitutional limits in Poland, see generally WOJCIECH 
SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019).  
 162. SADURSKI, supra note 161, at 58. 
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 166. Id. at 549–50. 
 167. See Kingsley, supra note 154 (quoting Peter Szepshazi, a sitting Hungarian judge, speculating 
that they “may have been approached by people . . . who may have conveyed the message that it would 
be best if they stopped”); see also Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 66, at 549–50. 
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interdiction of violations of democratic norms is less apparent than the more 
established power to strike down offending legislation. Nonetheless, there are 
some examples of judicial intervention that are aimed not so much at forcing a 
direct confrontation with offending legislation than at restoring decisionmaking 
back into normal political channels in such ways as to reinforce soft power.168 
This approach of restoring normal politics helps capture the role of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in forcing executive claims of national security exigency onto a 
template of demanding congressional action to support and assume 
responsibility for emergency measures. As previously addressed in work with 
Richard Pildes, I have argued that this has been the key to judicial sign-off in 
cases of war powers, along the lines of Justice Jackson’s typology in the Steel 
Seizure Cases.169 Similarly, the Brexit decision in Miller v. Secretary of State can 
be cast as compelling the proper forms of democratic deliberation in parliament 
rather than the expedient of executive action.170 The Israeli Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Ramat Gan Academic Center of Law and Business v. Knesset can 
be seen in a similar light.171 The Israeli’s Constitution requires that the 
legislature reviews and approves an annual budget recommended by the 
executive, and, when the executive branch attempted to change this to a 
biannual review thus limiting the legislature’s oversight, the court intervened 
and demanded a return to the normal procedure.172 
There are mechanisms of what Rosalind Dixon terms first-order deferral 
that allow a declaration of unconstitutionality or incompatibility with 
controlling higher authority to place back in the hands of the legislature the 
ability to reengage the issue after an adverse judicial determination.173 Examples 
 
 168. See supra Sections III.A.1.–2.  
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637. 
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include the Canadian “notwithstanding” provision174 and the European 
community’s similar mechanisms for a legislative acknowledgement of an 
adverse judicial ruling. In the European context, national legislatures may 
recommit to the importance of the policy objective through “derogation.”175 
While each in practice aims to restore a constitutional balance (though the 
Canadian power is almost never invoked),176 neither is directed specifically to 
the less mandatory values of tempered democratic deliberation. 
Pushing this judicial role a bit further are cases in which courts seek to 
reinforce proper institutional byways and thereby reorient democratic 
engagement, either by design or by result. Two examples from Canada and 
South Africa illustrate the point. 
1.  Quebec Secession 
Only twenty years ago, the fate of Canada as a nation seemed at issue. 
Quebec nationalism was at its high point and the separatist Parti Québécois was 
the largest political force in the province.177 The Canadian Supreme Court 
confronted a question as fundamental as it was unprecedented: “[W]e are asked 
to rule on the legality of unilateral secession ‘[u]nder the Constitution of 
Canada.’”178 As with most democracies, the Canadian Constitution was silent 
on the exact contours of Canadian democracy: “The representative and 
democratic nature of our political institutions was simply assumed.”179 There 
were no mediating principles in Canadian constitutional law or in general 
democratic principles that could resolve the apparent conflict should a majority 
of the Québécois opt for independence while a majority of the broader Canadian 
constituency (including the Québécois) vote to preserve the territorial integrity 
of Canada. Rather, Canadian politics had long subsumed a form of Québécois 
separate representation through the reigning Liberal Party requirement that the 
leadership of the party alternate between French and English speakers and the 
party’s practice of setting informal quotas for cabinet seats between the two 
 
unconstitutionality, a delay in the declaration of invalidity permits the legislature to remedy the 
violation in the first instance.”). 
 174. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, § 33, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); see Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and 
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 175. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing a right of derogation “[i]n time of war or other public 
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 176. Roach, supra note 174, at 543. 
 177. See ALVIN FINKEL, OUR LIVES: CANADA AFTER 1945, at 347–55 (1997). 
 178. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 263 (Can.). 
 179. Id. at 253. 
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groups.180 The question was one of identity, rather than national oppression or 
compelled subjugation—the customary fare of rights claims.181 
The court eschewed first-order constitutional resolution (i.e., is there or is 
there not a right of secession) in favor of reinforcing the capacity for democratic 
political debate. The court’s intervention granted separatist claims the right to 
initiate a dialog on dissolution of the country. In what is known as the “clear 
majority/clear question” requirement, the court mandated that a majority of the 
Québécois would have the right to initiate a process of political renegotiation 
whose outcome could be secession, although those terms remained unspecified: 
[A] referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic method of 
ascertaining the views of the electorate on important political questions 
on a particular occasion. The democratic principle identified above 
would demand that considerable weight be given to a clear expression by 
the people of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada, even though a 
referendum, in itself and without more, has no direct legal effect, and 
could not in itself bring about unilateral secession.182 
While unusual as a constitutional matter,183 the effect was to create mechanisms 
of both popular consultation and legislative deliberation to defuse and diffuse 
the mounting nationalist tensions, something that at the time had reached the 
level of terrorist attacks in the name of Quebec independence.184 
The threshold requirement of a clear outcome on a clear question, as the 
holding was termed,185 was never put to the test. The last referendum in Quebec 
occurred in 1995 and failed by less than 1.2%.186 But the capacity for democratic 
discourse leading to parliamentary negotiations allowed for some needed 
reforms and marked the end of the nationalist tensions in Quebec.187 By 2014, 
the nationalist Parti Québécois became a minority even in the provincial 
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 186. MARIO CARDINAL, BREAKING POINT: QUEBEC, CANADA, THE 1995 REFERENDUM 404 
(2005). 
 187. See Choudhry, Popular Revolution, supra note 183, at 488–91. 
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Quebec legislature,188 and Canada today has both a French-origin prime 
minister and a francophone chief justice of its Supreme Court.189 
Canada provides a useful and highly influential example of courts 
respecting and reinforcing the boundaries of democratic politics. The court 
sagely defused the sense of Quebec being aggrieved and used its constitutional 
authority in the service of democracy. At no point, however, in the disputes 
over Quebec was Canada at risk of descending into civil war or massive 
bloodshed. This was the primacy of politics in a decidedly mature and decent 
democratic society, which court intervention reinforced rather than supplanted. 
2.  Anticorruption in South Africa 
South Africa’s Constitution fails to provide sufficient checks on unilateral 
power, a defect that became apparent once leadership passed from the 
enlightened hands of Nelson Mandela to the kleptocratic ambitions of Jacob 
Zuma. In Westminster style, South Africa allows the same individual to serve 
as head of the ruling party, head of government, head of state, and head of the 
legislative faction.190 Once power passed to President Zuma, even the weak 
institutional constraints on the executive provoked resistance. Repeatedly, 
Zuma found himself in conflict with the independent public anticorruption 
prosecutorial authority,191 the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP), which the constitution unfortunately allowed the President to appoint 
pursuant to statutory qualifications.192 The statute said, among other things, that 
the National Director must “be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his 
or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity.”193 Shortly after assuming 
office in 2009, President Zuma appointed a crony as NDPP, precipitating a 
constitutional confrontation over whether the creation of an independent 
corruption oversight agency would serve as a check on misuse of presidential 
office.194 
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Zuma’s first appointment was rejected by a Constitutional Court opinion 
in 2012 notable for its assertion of muscular judicial authority in policing the 
structural integrity of the constitution: 
It is true that the functions of the National Director are not judicial in 
character. Yet, the determination of prosecution policy, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute and the duty to ensure that prosecution 
policy is complied with are . . . fundamental to our democracy. The office 
must be non-political and non-partisan and is closely related to the 
function of the judiciary broadly to achieve justice and is located at the 
core of delivering criminal justice.195 
In the meantime, the incumbent Public Protector continued investigating 
Zuma’s expanding fortune and, in particular, his efforts to transform his private 
lands into a monument at public expense.196 In her 2014 report, the Protector 
concluded that Zuma had been unduly enriched by the government coffers in 
the form of improvements such as a “cattle kraal, chicken run, swimming pool, 
visitors’ centre and the amphitheatre.”197 The President thus had violated the 
provisions of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act and the Executive Ethics 
Code.198 Not to be deterred, Zuma and the National Assembly commissioned 
an “independent” report by the Minister of Police that (not surprisingly) 
exculpated the President.199 
As evidence of the extent of corruption mounted, and as the Parliament 
remained unable to resist the entrenched executive and the commands of the 
ANC, the Constitutional Court issued a series of rulings whose cumulative 
effect was to prod parliamentary action.200 These decisions were noteworthy not 
for predetermining the outcome of claims against Zuma but for enabling the 
legislative branch to exercise its countervailing authority.201 The decisions 
required secret voting on no confidence motions and various protections of 
minority rights within the parliament.202 When the issue turned once again to 
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the independence of the prosecution authority over corruption, the 
Constitutional Court again interceded, this time ordering the President and 
National Assembly to comply with the Public Protector’s findings and repay 
the amounts wrongfully taken from the public fisc.203 
The saga continued as Zuma did not repay all of the amounts owed, 
attempted to appoint various cronies as NDPP, and finally sought to remove a 
2013 appointee who had begun yet another investigation.204 Zuma assumed the 
power to discharge any appointee and managed to obtain a pressured 
resignation in exchange for a payout well in excess of the salary of the latest 
NDPP appointees.205 Another lawsuit followed, this time before the High 
Court, Gauteng Division,206 which wasted no time rejecting Zuma’s claim of 
unilateral presidential authority: “In a rights-based order it is fundamental that 
a conflicted person cannot act; to act despite a conflict is self-evidently to 
pervert the rights being exercised as well as the rights of those affected.”207 
Because the President admitted that he intended to use the processes available 
to him to resist prosecution, he was obviously conflicted.208 
Of more immediate interest is the decree that followed. The court reversed 
all the efforts of President Zuma to control anticorruption efforts and ordered 
that “as long as the incumbent President is in office, the Deputy President is 
responsible for decisions relating to the appointment, suspension or removal of 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions.”209 Further, the court declared the 
unconstitutionality of the National Prosecuting Authority Act and offered a 
rewritten Act that would cure the constitutional defect of allowing presidential 
authority over an investigation of the President.210 But the court suspended the 
statutory revision for eighteen months and referred the entire matter to 
Parliament to cure the constitutional defect on its own.211 
 
 203. Econ. Freedom Fighters, 2016 (3) SA at 620–21. 
 204. Franny Rabkin, Zuma Had Been ‘Intent’ on Seeing Nxasana Leave the NPA, Zonda Commission 
Hears, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2019), https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-19-zuma-had-been-
intent-on-seeing-nxasana-leave-the-npa-zondo-commission-hears [https://perma.cc/YDP2-5M3N]; 
Mfuneko Toyana & James Macharia, South Africa’s Zuma Repays Some State Money in Home Improvement 
Scandal, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-zuma/south-africas-
zuma-repays-some-state-money-in-home-improvement-scandal-idUSKCN11I16V 
[https://perma.cc/DL3B-FZ4B].  
 205. Barry Bateman, Nxasana Was Paid Over R17M After Resigning, EYE WITNESS NEWS (June 3, 
2015), https://ewn.co.za/2015/06/03/Nxasana-paid-a-little-over-R17m-after-resigning 
[https://perma.cc/5MFC-NGHE].  
 206. Corruption Watch (RF) NPC & Another v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others; Council 
for the Advancement of the South African Constitution v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others 2018 
(1) All SA 471 (GP). 
 207. Id. at 32 para. 112. 
 208. Id. at 32 para. 115. 
 209. Id. at 38 para. 128.  
 210. Id. at 38–39 para. 129. 
 211. Id. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019) 
2019] JUDICIAL REVIEW 41 
As with the Canadian court’s novel solution, this story also turns out well. 
Once back in the hands of Parliament, the ongoing corruption scandals 
compelled a confrontation with President Zuma and led, ultimately, to his 
ouster at the hands of an awakened legislative branch and the ascension of 
President Cyril Ramaphosa.212 
✦        ✦        ✦ 
To summarize and to be clear: The world is filled with failed or failing 
judicial attempts to thwart the descent of weak democracies into autocratic and 
semi-autocratic rule. Hungary, Poland, and Russia are but some of the examples 
of courts that have stood tall and suffered accordingly.213 And the world has also 
witnessed captured judicial institutions serving to silence political opposition to 
entrenched power, with Venezuela serving as the leading example.214 Tom Daly 
well captures, with great skepticism, the curious demand that the least 
democratic of the branches of government secure an incompletely realized 
democracy, in effect “to transmute the base materials of a new democracy—an 
incomplete political settlement, a nascent commitment to democratic rule, and 
imperfect constitutional and international texts—into the gold of a functioning 
democracy.”215 
What is being offered is not by any means a certain antidote to the erosion 
of democratic norms of governance, nor even a universal constraint. In some 
high-functioning parliamentary inheritors of the Westminster tradition, courts 
have crafted an intermediary role with stronger defenses of rights claims but 
greater deference to the political branches to craft remedies.216 But in country 
after country, particularly in times of political instability, the observed reality 
is the insertion of the judiciary into the allocation of power among the political 
branches. In turn, “[t]he central role played by the courts can perversely raise 
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the stakes in political battles over who controls the courts.”217 There are 
sufficient counterexamples to undermine any claim to guaranteed outcomes, 
and no guarantee of success is being offered here. Instead, as nicely captured by 
Tom Ginsburg, the resulting paradox is that the “judicialization of politics has 
led to the politicization of the judiciary.”218 The question remains whether the 
expanded role of constitutional courts across the democratic world can usefully 
be invoked to protect subconstitutional democratic processes on a sustained 
basis. 
This returns to the opening theme of the capacity of the judiciary as an 
institution playing the role of a steward of democratic integrity, a role akin to 
that of a central banker assuming regulatory oversight over a democracy’s fiscal 
integrity. Such oversight at a remove from immediate electoral demands raises 
the concern of the ensuing democratic deficit.219 But the ability of an 
institutional buffer against democratic currents raises the prospect that perhaps 
the judiciary is not the ideal candidate for the job. In the United States, 
decisional constraints can be created not only through the federal government 
but also through tightly orchestrated review through an entity like the Base 
Closing Commission.220 In other countries, the function of overseeing even 
politics has been channeled outside constitutional courts. Thus, the Mexican 
transition to democracy relied heavily on the Federal Election Commission and 
on the specialized Supreme Electoral Court,221 and in post-Francoist Spain, the 
role was even assumed by the remaining claimant to the royal house, King Juan 
Carlos.222 And in the wake of the near-complete electoral meltdown in the 
presidential election of 1876, the United States Congress through the Electoral 
Count Act sought to keep electoral oversight in the hands of a specially 
designated body, rather than the Supreme Court.223 
Even without claiming exclusivity for courts as institutional bulwarks of 
democratic processes, there are nonetheless reasons that courts might be a 
superior institution for this role. Courts are established sites for the resolution 
of contested claims and have mechanisms relying on open public argument, 
structured inquiries, and reasoned judgments that do not simply dictate results 
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but attempt to persuade. There are rule of law metrics for assessing decisional 
results as well as comparisons to prior decisions by the same tribunal.224 Finally, 
in most democratic countries, the appointment process for judges to apex courts 
has some political accountability that keeps the judiciary within the broad bands 
of the country’s political currents, something that a king in Spain or the military 
in Turkey cannot claim.225 At the same time, the longer tenure of judges, 
whether by term or for life in the U.S. federal system, allows the judiciary a 
longer time horizon that allows an institutional distance from the press of 
immediacy of intense political moments.226 
In countries recently emerged from authoritarianism or civil war, 
principled judicial exposition may help ease the ensuing constitutional order 
from expedient arrangements that ease the transition to a fuller democratic 
order. Courts in such circumstances both resist the pressure toward absolutist 
invocations of universal human rights norms and also test the ongoing capacity 
of restrictions on civil liberties to continue, with examples stretching from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to Colombia.227 
IV.  JUDGES IN THE BREACH 
The erosion of the legislative branch as the fulcrum of democratic 
governance is the most worrisome aspect of the modern day challenge to 
democratic rule. This “decline of parliamentary sovereignty”228 breeds a lack of 
policy initiative and a corresponding loss of capability of democratically 
accountable institutions. Political power does not lightly tolerate a void, and 
into the policy space assigned to legislatures have stepped the executive and the 
agencies of the administrative state. As the competence of the legislative state 
diminishes and the decretal and administrative powers of the executive grow, 
the checking function of courts become more and more central. In turn, as 
judicial intervention becomes quotidian, so too do the capabilities of the courts 
and the comfort with a centralizing role. 
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A. Loss of State Competence and the Risk of Judicialization of Politics 
In some countries, the low level of state competence leads to tremendous 
pressure for courts to assume increased managerial responsibilities as a stopgap 
institution of last resort. In India, for example, the procedural vehicle of Article 
32 of the Constitution allowing direct filing of injunctive claims in the Supreme 
Court of India229 has led to famous interventions ordering the New Delhi Zoo 
authorities to remove the overgrown monkey population from the leafy center 
of the city230 or to order the removal of industry from the environs of Agra to 
protect the Taj Mahal from environmental degradation.231 In effect, the 
Supreme Court of India has become the forum for redress of admittedly 
desperate social ills as fundamental as the breakdown of sanitary facilities.232 
As courts stretch their reach into domains once considered the workings 
of the political process, there seems a strong logic to not just measuring the 
democratic inputs of the society but the outputs as well. Under the sweeping 
rubric of social rights litigation, apex courts increasingly see in open-textured 
constitutional commands an invitation to direct the deployment of societal 
resources, a task ideally relegated to the policy-setting role of the legislature. 
Legislative failure invites action. For example, the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has declared a right of “everyone to 
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
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personal and domestic uses.”233 In Colombia, the Constitutional Court has 
accepted this mandate as a constitutional obligation to oversee the requirements 
and processes for the termination of municipal services. Beginning in at least 
2007, when the Constitutional Court ordered the reconnection of water service 
for a seriously ill woman unable to pay her utility bills,234 the court has 
superintended the creation of “appropriate pricing policies such as free or low-
cost water.”235 In highly detailed injunctive orders under its tutela power of 
constitutional oversight,236 the court has struck down individual suspension of 
water services for minors, for the indigent, or where the court deemed a breach 
of a fundamental right.237 In effect, the court became the prime regulator of a 
public function as old as the Roman aqueducts. 
Brazil is perhaps the best example of the new judicialization of politics,238 
combining discredited political institutions with ample rights guarantees 
unqualified by the types of ability to realize constraints found in other expansive 
modern constitutions, such as with the “progressive realization” provision of the 
South African Constitution.239 Nowhere is this seen more clearly than with 
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regard to health care claims for medication that is unaffordable to an individual 
claimant.240 The stunning success rate of such litigated claims241 results in a 
significant portion of the national health care system’s budget that “is used to 
pay for judicially mandated medication and treatment.”242 In these cases, 
Brazilian courts read the guarantees of Article 196 very expansively: “[A]n 
individual litigant must simply prove that a health need, as described in a 
doctor’s prescription, was not met, and the benefit will then need to be granted 
by the state regardless of costs.”243 In effect, resource allocation has shifted from 
the legislature or executive branch administrators to the judiciary, which in turn 
may short-circuit the customary political debates about resource allocation in 
favor of a “syllogistic” mandate that if a right is identified, an entitlement to 
state-provided benefits must ensue.244 Conrado Hübner Mendes argues that 
this shift from legislative to judicial resource allocation and rights protection is 
not so much a practical necessity but the result of “the underlying quality of 
constitutional scrutiny: it frames, in a conflictive partnership with the legislator, 
the boundaries of the political domain.”245 
Certainly, there are many examples of courts around the world venturing 
into clear areas of social policy, parallel to the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court 
ordering state-financed access to expensive medicines, or the Colombian 
Constitutional Court directing a minimum provision of water to all citizens, or 
the Indian Supreme Court assuming responsibility for how sanitation services 
shall be provided. Courts have moved quite far from the expositors of negative 
constraints on governmental conduct to mandating positive returns to 
disadvantaged or disfavored groups, in the spirit of Isaiah Berlin’s famous 
typology.246 In some countries, courts even hold hearings on issues of social 
rights, assuming the power to become what Daly terms “positive legislators.”247 
Nor is this confined to economically vulnerable democracies. Commenting 
on the centralization of opioid litigation in a single federal U.S. court, the 
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presiding judge, Dan Polster, lamented that the “federal court is probably the 
least likely branch of government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the other 
branches of government, federal and state, have punted. So it’s here.”248 
Courts as competent gap-fillers for democratic governmental incapacity 
presents a different set of issues than the normal accounts of judicial review. 
This is not a case of fashioning judicial review to serve as a countermajoritarian 
brake to protect discrete and insular parts of the society who cannot avail 
themselves “of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.”249 Nor is this a matter of relying on courts to bring to life an 
“enlightened” vision of a society’s better angels, extending equal rights to same-
sex couples, for example.250 Rather, this is the substitution of judicial authority 
for the ordinary, if complicated, role of other institutions of democratic 
governance. Courts serving as the last available source of state competence is 
not the customary justification for judicial review. But courts in the delicate 
domain of allocating scarce public resources among competing social claims, 
particularly once the courthouse doors swing open, raises deep concern for the 
institutional competence of the courts. The very nature of litigation focuses 
attention on the matters that happen to be before the courts, while the silent 
majority of social concerns may find no exposition in a special case focused on 
a specific kind of medical care or addressing a specific need for remediation. 
Among other concerns, litigation-directed social policy may privilege those 
causes or classes with the readiest access to legal resources and may actually 
constitute a regressive reallocation of public resources.251 
The loss of state competence in democratic societies252 pushes courts into 
areas of state responsibility once properly reserved for the political branches. 
The line between rights declaration and assumption of responsibility for 
governmental functions has always been permeable. The equitable powers of 
American judges issuing structural injunctions over the functioning of prisons 
or schools certainly tested the boundaries between adjudication and 
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administration.253 But when the loss of competence is coupled with the erosion 
of legitimacy of democratic politics, the temptation for judicial action appears 
inescapable. The discrediting of the entire political class in Brazil, to take a 
recent dramatic example, invites despair over the institutional capabilities of 
democratic government to fulfill its most basic social mandate.254 
Doctrines such as equity in the common law tradition, or amparo and tutela 
in civil law jurisdictions, recognize the need for a power of the exceptions held 
in the judiciary, particularly when confronting governmental misconduct or 
incapacity. To this exceptional account of broad judicial intervention may now 
be added the sophisticated claim of Justice Barroso that the need for judicial 
intervention may not be exceptional but structural. The risk is that 
transgressing the presumptive centrality of the legislative branch may invite 
excessive judicialization of politics. Even so, on this account, the presumptive 
legitimacy of democratic politics may be compromised through the public 
choice set of “problems attributed to (i) failure of the electoral and party system, 
(ii) party minorities that function as ‘veto players,’ obstructing the prevailing 
will of the parliamentary majority, and (iii) the eventual trapping by special 
interests.”255 
The consequence for Barroso is a “democratic deficit of political 
representation,” in turn serving as an invitation for judges to assert a vision of 
the public good “not subject to the short-term volatilities of electoral politics.”256 
For advocates of this vision of constitutional judging, including not only 
Barroso but the German theorist Robert Alexy, constitutional judging becomes 
a form of popular representation above and beyond electoral politics.257 Alexy 
stretches this claim to root democratic legitimacy not in electoral results but in 
“argumentative representation” such that “[a]n adequate concept of democracy 
 
 253. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011) (upholding court-ordered reduction in 
prison population); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 (1979) (upholding court-
ordered desegregation plan); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1389 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 679 
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that prison conditions violated the Constitution and appointing 
special masters and monitors to supervise the implementation of and compliance with court-mandated 
changes).  
 254. One indication is the approval rating of President Temer on the eve of the most recent 
elections. As of April 2018, Temer’s approval rating had slipped to five percent, with seventy-two 
percent of the population rating him “bad” or “terrible.” Lisandra Paraguassú & Anthony Boadle, supra 
note 34. In turn, a right-wing populist won the presidential election, demonizing the opposition and 
heralding the order of the period of military rule. Anthony Faiola & Marina Lopes, Bolsanaro Wins 
Brazilian Presidency, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazilians-go-the-polls-with-far-right-jair-
bolsonaro-as-front-runner/2018/10/28/880dd53c-d6dd-11e8-8384-
bcc5492fef49_story.html?utm_term=.a879854c80b4 [https://perma.cc/KMG7-N9SR (dark archive)]. 
 255. Barroso, Countermajoritarian, supra note 28, at 129. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
572, 578 (2005). 
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must . . . comprise not only decision but also argument.”258 Because judicial 
decisions may be tested by reasoned public review, the correctness of such 
decisions may afford democratic legitimacy separate from, and indeed often 
superior to, that of the political branches.259 The publicity of this form of 
argumentation then allows for an “indirect electoral link” to popular acceptance, 
to use Mattias Kumm’s formulation.260 
B. Managing the Risk 
At risk when the link to electoral politics becomes too attenuated is that 
the judiciary will become simply a substitute for democratic politics. Once 
armed with constitutional authority, emboldened by its reservoir of 
competence, and then ennobled by the public choice insight about the risk of 
capture of the political branches, there is the risk that the domain of politics is 
limited to confirmation of first-order constitutional proclamations of rights. All 
the more so if claims of “ex post facto popular approval” of judicial interpretations 
by public acquiescence provide for no real measure of such endorsement of 
judicial authority.261 Here I find myself in agreement with Bellamy that, under 
such a broad claim of judicial power, the judiciary itself will become the 
battleground for partisan strife, most visibly at times of contested judicial 
appointments, and that battles over the judiciary will displace normal forms of 
partisan contest through politics: “Effort will go into capturing the judiciary 
rather than constructing a legislative majority by reaching a mutually acceptable 
compromise with one’s political opponents. As a result, both sides become ever 
more polarised.”262 But the risk potentially reaches beyond the question of who 
sits as the judicial expositor of broad constitutional rights. 
While there are many examples of increasingly pitched battles over who 
are the judges, from the United States to Argentina, there are few examples of 
judges so commanding public policy as to diminish democratic politics in some 
 
 258. Id. at 579. 
 259. See Mattias Kumm, Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Review, in 
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project of the 1991 constitution.”). 
 260. See Kumm, supra note 259, at 207. 
 261. Ana Micaela Alterio, Una Justificacion Mayoritaria del Control Judicial de Constitucionalidad: La 
Representacion Argumentativa en la Democracia Deliberativa, in 1 ENTRE LA LIBERTAD Y LA IGUALDAD: 
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provable context. But an analogy may be drawn to the hollowed ambit of 
domestic politics in the European context in ways that may serve as a caution. 
Writing at the beginning of the populist upsurge that would bring to 
prominence Wilders in the Netherlands, Le Pen in France, Podemos in Spain, 
Five Star in Italy, and a host of more menacing figures in Eastern Europe, Peter 
Mair cautioned that the centralization of increasing authority in European 
authorities had voided domestic national politics of responsibility for 
governance. The increased distance between electoral contestation and 
governing authority made politics a choice grounds for increasingly demagogic 
posturing with little accountability for subsequent governance. With broad 
anticipation of how traditional European political parties have withered before 
polar politics, Mair wrote: 
As popular involvement fades, . . . and as indifference grows, we can 
expect that even those citizens who do continue to participate will prove 
more volatile, more uncertain and more random in their expressions of 
preference. If politics no longer counts for so much, then not only should 
the willingness to vote begin to falter; so also should the sense of 
commitment among those who continue to take part. Choices are likely 
to prove more fickle, and to be more susceptible to the play of short-term 
factors. . . . Hand in hand with indifference goes inconsistency.263 
And if the result of political posturing is that Spain is without a 
government for months on end,264 or Belgium even longer,265 not much matters 
because ultimate responsibility lies at the non-electoral level of European Union 
administration. When governance fails, Brussels may still rule Belgium, but it 
is not the elected representatives of the Belgian citizenry who are making the 
decisions. By analogy, the risk is that the judicialization of public policy may 
similarly contribute to voiding out customary politics and even turn national 
politics into a referendum on the judiciary. Certainly hostility to the European 
Court of Human Rights has been an oft-raised theme among the populist right 
in Europe, and the social rights rulings of the Colombian Constitutional Court 
serve as the backdrop for political contestation seemingly far removed from the 
actual rulings of the court.266 
 
 263. PETER MAIR, RULING THE VOID: THE HOLLOWING OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 29 
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Here too there is an intermediary position akin to the process-
reinforcement of the Canadian and South African courts in the context of 
governing structures. Courts faced with grave questions of subsistence and 
other first-order policy questions do at times simply assume the role of a quasi-
legislature and create, in effect, a new administrative body under judicial 
mandate.267 But courts can also interpret existing laws and decrees to force the 
government to meet the burden of its existing obligations, or courts can compel 
the government to take up an issue of contested social rights under threat of 
judicial intervention.268 Thus, Po Jen Yap usefully distinguishes between 
judicial interventions that substitute for the failure of the political process to 
address a social need, those that force greater implementation of pre-existing 
social programs, and those that compel the government to take up the contested 
issue and assume political responsibility for its resolution.269 Confined judicial 
intervention may even be more rights-enabling than substitution for the 
political process altogether.270 
1.  Brazil 
An example from Brazil shows the difficulty of courts trying to weigh the 
costs and benefits of competing claims for limited societal resources. In 2016, 
the STF ordered the impoverished state of Rio Grande do Norte to provide an 
individual claimant free access to the drug Sildenafil, notwithstanding the 
$5000 USD price tag for each box of medication.271 Viewed as a question of 
individual entitlement, such decisions betray an absence of “normative 
criteria”272 for assessing competing claims to scarce resources. There are also 
serious concerns not just of distribution of public resources but of allocation, as 
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wealthier individuals more capable of maneuvering in the legal system may 
siphon off state resources by demanding free state-provided medication.273 
In dissent, Justice Barroso offered two alternative paths. First, he noted 
that there should be mechanisms to check the public health decisions made by 
state officials in terms of the efficacy of alternative medications, the availability 
of lower cost substitutes, and a range of other considerations that might channel 
the judicial rights inquiry into the more traditional pathways of cost-benefit 
regulatory oversight.274 More central to this inquiry, however, is the second 
approach offered by Justice Barroso. Rather than rushing to implement a 
remedy under the broad mantle of rights jurisprudence, Barroso urges courts to 
draw in state regulators, including experts from the public health system, to 
focus government attention on the health issues before the courts.275 By contrast 
to the first-order rights claims, such a procedural vehicle would compel public 
authorities to engage in public policy dialogue.276 The approach follows a focus 
on court intervention to “open up public institutions that have chronically failed 
to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal 
processes of political accountability.”277 
What distinguishes this process-reinforcing approach from simple rights 
proclamation is the engagement of the political branches to discharge their 
duties of democratic governance. The aim is to compel political engagement 
with pressing social issues, particularly on behalf of the most vulnerable 
members of the society but without predetermining the outcome of that 
engagement. In effect, this is the same posture for judicial intervention as the 
process-driven reinforcement of democratic soft power already seen in the 
examples from Canada and South Africa in the domain of democratic 
governance. 
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2.  South Africa 
The South African Constitution, through sections 26 and 27,278 guarantees 
a right to housing and to health care, food, and social security.279 These rights 
are justiciable280 and may be invoked by individual litigants, as in Brazil. Both 
of these provisions are qualified, however, by considerations of reasonableness 
and adequacy of resources: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of each of these rights.”281 
In Government of South Africa v. Grootboom,282 the Constitutional Court 
distinguished the rights guarantees from the necessary deference to political 
authorities for the actual policies taken to implement the constitutional 
protections.283 At issue was a land seizure by squatters who rightly claimed 
government unresponsiveness to their need for housing relief.284 Unlike the 
blanket Brazilian order to provide a needed medication, the court asked about 
the reasonableness of the government’s overall decisions285 and acknowledged 
“that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet 
its obligations.”286 This reasonableness inquiry of necessity must be “extremely 
context-sensitive,”287 allowing the court to condemn the government for its 
complete inaction “in that it failed to provide for any form of relief to those 
desperately in need of access to housing” and requiring policy development “to 
devise, fund, implement and supervise measures to provide relief to those in 
desperate need.”288 
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The Court rejected an alternative claim for judicial declaration of a 
“minimum core” of housing entitlements as beyond judicial competence: 
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing without 
first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a 
right. These will vary according to factors such as income, 
unemployment, availability of land and poverty. . . . All this illustrates 
the complexity of the task of determining a minimum core obligation for 
the progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing 
without having the requisite information on the needs and the 
opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. The committee developed 
the concept of minimum core over many years of examining reports by 
reporting states. This Court does not have comparable information.289 
While critics would no doubt have preferred the categorical elaboration of 
rights,290 as in Brazil, the South African approach forces onto the legislative 
agenda a more transparent engagement with resource claims by those at risk of 
political disregard. In such cases, “the greatest reasons for restraint” have been 
the product of the novelty of the rights claims “not in relation to the idea that 
citizens have socio-economic entitlements against the state, but in relation to 
issues of implementation.”291 
3.  India 
Alternatively, apex courts may attempt to ground rights in broader 
constitutional guarantees while using underenforced legislation as the remedial 
framework. As a practical matter, there is every reason to believe that “litigating 
on the basis of the government’s own standards is a very powerful tactic, and 
any attempt by government to repeal or roll back its own standards will be both 
conspicuous and ripe for challenge as a retrogressive step.”292 For example, the 
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Indian Supreme Court addressed threatened mass starvation in Rajasthan under 
the judicially unenforceable constitutional guarantees of Article 21 (“No person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law”) and Article 47 (“The State shall regard the raising of the 
level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement 
of public health as among its primary duties”).293 Rather than circumvent the 
absence of a constitutional enforcement mechanism, the court accepted the 
constitutional mandate as a declaration of fundamental social policy. That 
constitutional interpretation then allowed the court to look to legislative 
enactments in light of the constitutional commitment. In the specifics of the 
decision, the court drew its specific remedial authority from the statutory 
Famine Code in Rajasthan294 and issued dozens of interim administrative orders 
that were to be implemented through the overall statutory framework. 
Ultimately, court supervision terminated in 2017, following more 
comprehensive legislative action: “In view of the passage of the National Food 
Security Act, 2013, nothing further survives in this petition. It is accordingly 
disposed of.”295 
The contrast is between engaging a one-off claim for resources as a straight 
matter of individual entitlement and compelling the political branches to take 
responsibility for social welfare. This is well-captured in the South African 
Constitutional Court’s general “emphasis on assessing social policies and 
programs to ensure that they take adequate account of the needs and 
circumstances of the most disadvantaged, its readiness to prod government to 
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implement such changes, and its chariness toward individual claims for direct 
relief.”296 
CONCLUSION 
Few contests in life are fully self-regulating. Even markets premised on 
freedom of contract need overseers to prevent untoward manipulations. I 
confess to little patience for first-order claims of the primacy of legislative 
politics that cannot be tested against the lived experience of democratic 
governments today. The period since the end of the Soviet empire has yielded 
more democracies than at any time in human history and has allowed more 
humans to have a say in the election of their governors than ever before. At the 
same time, these democracies suffer the loss of the governing drive of the 
legislative branches, the collapse of their historic political parties, and increased 
populist demands to unwind their institutions. In some older democracies, these 
are venerated institutions of governance; in other younger counterparts, they 
arise in countries still trying to shake off the legacies of not quite forgotten old 
autocratic regimes. To speak glowingly of a halcyon English parliamentary past 
in the cossetted days of the British empire has little to offer debates around the 
world or even in Britain today. 
The premise of Fragile Democracies was that constitutional courts could ill 
afford to be passive night watchmen over democracies in formation. For the 
suddenly emerged efforts at popular sovereignty cobbled from the collapse of 
autocratic states, the institutions were too vulnerable to permit courts to check 
only partisan excesses. Instead, the core workings of democratic institutions had 
to be nurtured so that the habits of democratic governance could take hold. 
Courts had to learn “to intervene to constitutionally valuable ends.”297 
Dividing the world between the newly-installed fragile democracies and 
the stable regimes in the United States and Europe may have been error. It may 
be that all democracies carry the seeds of their own fragility, with the older 
states being distinguished by having greater protective institutional 
guardrails.298 The era of rising populist anger and the dysfunction of modern 
democracies is hopefully transitory. For as long as these moments last, however, 
there is greater pressure for judicial engagement with the institutional 
foundations of democratic governance. Whether the threat is to institutions or 
norms, or whether it is as a result of other branches’ inability or unwillingness 
to act in the best interest of democracy, the judiciary may emerge as the last 
best hope for the preservation of the basic structures of democracy. This may 
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not be the first, best world of perfectly functioning legislative politics. On the 
other hand, humans were forced from Eden a long time ago and have adapted 
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